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IN DEFENSE OF ASTON PARK: THE CASE FOR
STATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
REVIEW OF HEALTH CARE
REGULATION
JOSHUA

A.

NEWBERGt

States now stand at a crossroads, reexamining their roles in regulating construction of hospital bed space and other health carefacilities.
With the retreatfrom federal control of the field, states are likely to be
amending their existing regulatory schemes. Joshua A. Newberg envisions an activist role for state courts in assessing the validity of such
schemes under state constitutional law. Adopting a 1973 North Carolina Supreme Court opinion as his analytical model, Mr. Newberg
mounts a justificationfor substantive due process review of health-care
regulation. The Article argues that the bases for rejecting economic due
process review under the United States Constitution do not carry over to
analogousstate constitutionalprovisions. Mr. Newberg sees state courts

as tools for vindication of the public interest when state legislaturesfall
captive to special interests and enact anticompetitive laws.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In re Aston Park Hospital, Inc.,' decided in 1973 by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, is a leading case supporting the proposition that substantive due
process review of economic regulation persists in some state courts 2 decades after the federal judiciary abandoned such review. 3 In Aston Park, the North Carolina court struck down a 1971 state statute4 under which the state had denied a
t J.D. 1989, M.A. 1982, B.A. 1981, University of Pennsylvania. Clerk to the Honorable
William Holloway, Jr., Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The author wishes to acknowledge the considerable assistance of Professor Michael Fitts.
Thanks also to Adjunct Professor Bonnie Brier and to Lori Kettering for their contributions to this
article.
1. 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729 (1973).
2. See, eg., C. HAVIGHuRsT, HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY 226 (1988); T. MORGAN, J.
HARRISON & P. VERKUIL, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS 49-52 (1985) [hereinafter EcoNOMIC REGULATION); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger
Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873, 885 (1976); Kirby, Expansive Judicial Review of Economic Regulation
Under State Constitutions: The Case For Realism, 48 TENN. L. REV. 241, 256 (1981); Comment,
HospitalRegulation After Aston Park- Substantive Due Process in North Carolina,52 N.C.L. REv.
763, 765-66 (1974).
3. For examples of the United States Supreme Court's extreme deference to legislative judgment, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) ("under the system of government created
by our constitution, it is up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation"); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day is gone when this Court
uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of
business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony
with a particular school of thought.").
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-291 (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1973).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

certificate of need (CON)5 to a hospital for the expansion of its facilities. 6 The
holding was doctrinally based on an economic substantive due process rationale,

informed by a presumption in favor of market competition. 7 By adopting this
approach, the Court in Aston Park decisively rejected a national trend in state
regulation of health care that had resulted in a proliferation of CON statutes
across the United States between 1966 and 1973.8
A second wave of state CON statutes 9 passed in response to the National

Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 197410 (NHPRDA or 1974
Health Planning Act) effectively eclipsed Aston Park. Nevertheless, it may be
instructive to reexamine Aston Park in light of the 1986 repeal of the 1974

Health Planning Act' 1 and the recent emergence of a national movement toward
increased competition in the health care industry and the partial deregulation of

health care facilities construction. 12 The Aston Park decision should interest
both state legislatures considering whether to maintain in whole or in part the
5. For purposes of this discussion, the author adopts the definition of "certificate of need"
legislation employed by Professor Payton and (then) Clinical Instructor Powsner of the University of
Michigan. Payton & Powsner, Regulation Through the Looking Glass: Hospitals, Blue Cross, and
Certficate-of-Need, 79 MICH. L. REV. 203, 203 n.l (1980) ("We use the term 'certificate of need'
broadly to mean any exercise of state licensing authority with respect to health care facilities or
services where the standards for the exercise of such authority are described in terms of the 'need' for
the facilities or services.").
6. Aston Park, 282 N.C. at 548, 193 S.E.2d at 733.
7. Id. at 549-50, 193 S.E.2d at 734-735.
8. See, eg., Act of August 30, 1967, ch. 1597, 1967 Cal. Stat. 3826 (codified as amended at 38a
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 437 (West Supp. 1989)); Act of March 21, 1972, ch. 228, 1972
Kan. Sess. Laws 911 (codified as amended at 65 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2(a)(01)-2(a)(14) (1985) (repealed 1976)); Act of May 8, 1970, ch. 617, 1970 N.Y. Laws 2257 (codified as amended at 45 N.Y.
PuB. HEALTH § 2801(a) (Supp. 1989)).
9. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 9, 1976, ch. 854, § 8, 1976 Cal. Stat. 1931, 1937-39 (codified as
amended at 38a CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 437.10 (West 1979)) (outlining projects requiring
certificate of need); Act of June 26, 1974, ch. 74-323, § 23, 1974 Fla. Laws 997, 1009 (codified as
amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 154.245 (West 1989)) (certificate of need required as a condition to
bond validation and project construction); Act of Mar. 30, 1978, ch. 687, § 304, 1978 Me. Laws
3067, 3071-72 (repealed 1981) (certificate of need required); Act of Aug. 6, 1979, Pub. Health and
Welfare, § 4, 1979 Mo. Laws 383, 385-86 (codified as amended at Mo. ANN. STAT. § 197.315
(Vernon 1983)) (certificate required); Act of Dec. 13, 1979, No. 1979-118, 1979 Pa. Laws 532 (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 448.701 (Purdon 1989)); Act of Apr. 9, 1977, ch. 105,
§ 16-2D-3, 1977 W.Va. Acts 448, 453-55 (codified as amended at W. VA. CODE § 16-2D-3 (1985))
(certificate of need required). For a number of illuminating perspectives on state certificate of need
regimes after the 1974 Health Planning Act, see Symposium: Certificate-of-Need Laws in Health
Planning, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1978). After some resistance, see North Carolina ex rel. Morrow
v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978), the North
Carolina legislature passed a second certificate of need statute, Act of July 15, 1983, ch. 775, § 1,
1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 895, 941-57 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-175 to -191
(1988)), to conform with the requirements of the 1974 Health Planning Act. See also Havighurst &
McDonough, The Lithotripsy Game in North Carolina:A New Technology Under Regulation and
Deregulation, 19 IND. L. REV. 989, 992 n.12 (1986) (comparing access to and costs of nonsurgical
treatment for urinary stones under a restrictive state regulatory regime and under a market-oriented
regulatory regime).
10. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225, 2584 (1974), repealed by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-660, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799.
11. See Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 70(a), 100 Stat. 3799.
12. For a discussion of the future of health care regulation, see C. HAVIGHURST, supranote 2,
at 935; Havighurst, The Changing Locus of Decision Making in the Health Care Sector, 11 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 697, 720-30 (1986); Simpson, Full Circle: The Certificateof Need Regulation of Health Facilitiesto State Control, 19 IND. L. REV. 1025, 1079-87 (1986).
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CON regimes that still exist in most states and, more importantly for purposes
of this Article, state courts as they weigh the merits of challenges to CON statutes in the context of a more competitive health care market.
Although advocates of a competitive health care market may approve of the
Aston Park result, Justice Lake's concise opinion raises a number of troubling
issues. These issues concern, most significantly, the role of the court and the
propriety of economic substantive due process review of state health care regulation. The Aston Park court, however, did not articulate a rigorously developed
rationale for its conclusions. This Article examines some of the fundamental
issues raised by Aston Park and sets forth a rationale for the decision that is
firmly rooted both in the history of state CON regulation of health care and in
constitutional, political, and economic theory. It argues that certain circumstances of "legislative failure" justify state substantive due process review of economic legislation such as that engaged in by the North Carolina Supreme Court
in Aston Park. The Article concludes that a state statutory CON regime for the
restriction of health care facilities construction presents a particularly strong
case for substantive due process review.
Section II of this Article briefly sketches the history of state CON regulation of health care and reviews the Aston Park case in detail. Section III focuses
on the constitutional doctrine of substantive due process and the rationale for
substantive due process review of economic regulation by state courts. Section
IV explores the theoretical and empirical possibilities of conceptualizing state
CON regulation of health care facilities construction as an example of industry
"capture" and legislative failure. The Article concludes in Section V by briefly
examining Aston Park's implications for current public policy.
II.
A.

ASTON PARK IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Law Before Aston Park

The CON regime enacted by the North Carolina legislature in 197113 was
part of a national trend in health care regulation originating in the late 1940s
and 1950s. 14 That period saw both an unprecedented boom in the construction"5 of hospital facilities and an alarming increase in health care cost inflation. 16 Concern over rising health care costs and a growing interest in
government planning of health care investment 17 combined with a number of
13. Act of July 27, 1971, ch. 1164, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1715 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
(Supp. 1971) (repealed 1973)).
14. Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 238-39; Simpson, supra note 12, at 1033.

§ 90-291

15. R. STEVENS, IN SICKNESS AND IN WEALTH 229 (1989); Payton & Powsner, supra note 5,

at 236-38.
16. Per capita expenditures on health care rose from $82 to $146 between 1950 and 1960.
Increases in health care expenditures significantly outpaced the increase in Gross National Product
during the same period as health-care costs rose from 4.4% of GNP in 1950 to 5.3% of GNP in
1960. C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 2, at 69. The factors contributing to health-care inflation included increasing labor costs, expensive new medical technologies, and rapidly increasing demand
for health services. Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 238-39.
17. See REGULATING HEALTH FACILITIES CONSTRUCTION (1974) [hereinafter HEALTH FACILrrIES] (collection of papers presented at a 1974 conference sponsored by the American Enterprise
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other factors to bring about the passage of state CON regimes to regulate hospital construction. 1 8 The passage of the Comprehensive Health Planning and
Health Services Amendments of 196619 (CHPHSA), as well as the Partnership
for Health Amendments of 1967,20 accelerated the movement that began in the
states. Both pieces of legislation provided federal funding for state and local
agencies charged with planning capital expenditures for health care construction.2 1 In 1968, the American Hospital Association and its affiliates expressed
22
6nthusiastic support for the passage by state legislatures of state CON statutes.
These statutes would authorize state and local commissions not just to advise
and consult, but also to bar hospital construction found to exceed local "need."
"Between 1969 and 1972, twenty states adopted various forms of CON regulation, typically at the urging of the voluntary hospitals, the public health establishment, and the Blue Cross, and always on the premise that it would help to
'23
contain costs."
Although generalization necessarily entails some oversimplification, the
commonly articulated purposes of the state CON statutes may be summarized as
follows: 1) to prevent capital investment in "excess" hospital capacity; 24 2) to
preserve and improve the quality of institutional health care;2 5 3) "to achieve a
uniform geographic distribution of health services or an equitable distribution of
health services among social and economic groups;"' 26 and 4) to facilitate public
participation in health care investment decisions. 27 State CON regimes, then,
theoretically were based on several interdependent arguments. The threshold
claim was that the private market failed to provide for optimal capital investInstitute for Public Policy Research and the Committee on Legal Issues in Health Care at Duke
University School of Law); Simpson, supra note 12, at 1035; see also R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at
213-83 (explaining the close relation between institutional advocates of the voluntary hospital and
the efforts of federal government health care facilities planners in the two decades immediately following World War II).
18. R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 305-08; Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 258.
19. Pub. L. No. 89-749, 80 Stat. 1180 (1966) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 246 (1982)).
20. Pub. L. No. 90-174, 81 Stat. 533 (1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
21. R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 306 ("Comprehensive health-planning ... agencies, set up
under [CHPHSA], provided federal funding to states for statewide planning, [and] for the establishment of areawide or metropolitan health planning agencies at the local level."); Simpson, supra note
12, at 1034 ("The comprehensive health planning agencies were expected to provide consultation,
not to control or regulate facility expenditures," but the distance from consultation to regulation
proved to be no more than a few years.).
22. Curran, A National Hospital Survey and Analysis of State Certificate-of-Need Laws for
Health Facilities,in HEALTH FACILITIES, supra note 17, at 89; R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 307
("The American Hospital Association, although strongly supporting voluntary health planning in
the late 1960s as a means of achieving a middle position, pushed for controlled competition of new
construction through state-mandated certificate-of-need (CON) legislation.").
23. Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 213.
24. Havighurst, Regulation ofHealth FacilitiesandServices by "Certificateof Need", 59 VA. L.
REv. 1143, 1149 (1973); Simpson, supra note 12, at 1028 n.16.
25. Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 257; Simpson, supra note 12, at 1029.
26. Simpson, supra note 12, at 1030-31.
27. Grosse, The Need ForHealth Planning,in HEALTH FACILITIES, supra note 17, at 27-31;
Simpson, supranote 12, at 1032; see also R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 306 (referring to "the urge to
democratize the [health care facilities construction] planning process" animating the decisions of
health policy planners in the late 1960s and early 1970s).
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ment in hospital facilities and that if left to itself the market would produce
substantial excess capacity. 28 From this claim followed the argument that the
excess capacity was substantially responsible for rising hospital costs29 and that
a government body should therefore impose legally enforceable restrictions on
hospital construction.30 Advocates of state CON regimes--either implicitly or

in express terms--drew an analogy between hospital facilities investment decisions and those faced in public utility regulation. 3 1 In numerous speeches and
articles in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the hospital was categorized as a

"'public utility' subject to... control by the government."'32 There was, moreover, a "widely-held expectation among health policy makers [during this period] . . .that prevailing economic and social forces would lead to centralized
control of health services delivery in the United States along the lines of the
national health ... systems of western European countries." '33 Confounding
these predictions, however, a decisive trend toward deregulation gathered mo34
mentum in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

B.

The Aston Park Case
In 1971, at the height of this first wave of state CON regulation, Aston Park

Hospital, Inc. filed an application for a certificate of need with the North Carolina Medical Care Commission to permit the construction of a 200-bed general

hospital in Asheville, North Carolina. 35 The 200-bed facility was to replace a
50-bed hospital that Aston Park had operated for many years.3 6 Although Aston Park did not intend to use local, state, or federal funds in constructing the

facility, 37 the Commission denied the certificate of need. The Commission of28. C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 2, at 931; Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 209; Posner,
Certificates of Need for Health CareFacilities:A Dissenting View, in HEALTH FACILITIES, supranote
17, at 117; Simpson, supra note 12, at 1028-29.
29. Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 268-69.

30. See R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 284-309; Curran, supra note 22, at 108-11; Payton &

Powsner, supra note 5, at 268-71; Simpson, supra note 18, at 1028-29.
31. See Curran, supra note 22, at 85, 91-92; Priest, Possible Adaptation of Public Utility Concepts in the Health CareField,35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 839, 840-41 (1970); Grad, Commentary
on the Papers, in HEALTH FACILITIES, supra note 17, at 89, 121. Prominent among the traditional
economic rationales for regulatory interference with the private market is the perceived necessity of

preventing wasteful duplication of facilities in those situations in which the market will not correct
the problem of overinvestment in unneeded capacity. See generally ECONOMIC REGULATION, supra
note 2, at 4-135 (discussing the economic and legal considerations typically raised by the "wasteful
duplication" argument for government regulation of the provision of a given good or service).
32. Curran, supra note 22, at 89.
33. Simpson, supra note 12, at 1035.
34. See generallv C. HAVIGHURST, supra note 2, at 934-35 ("Congress's enthusiasm for regulating the health care sector began to wane in the late 1970s, reflecting both political trends and
pragmatic assessments of regulation's achievements both in health care and in other regulated industries"); R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 308-09 ("[B]y 1980 effective regulation had not been achieved.
President Carter, abandoning a major fight for hospital cost-control legislation in 1978, blamed the
'selfish concerns' of the hospital and medical lobby for its failure. But from the hospitals' point of
view government regulation piled on additional costs and harassment. Government and the hospitals were now antagonists.").
35. Aston Park, 282 N.C. at 542, 193 S.E.2d at 730.
36. Id. at 543, 193 S.E.2d at 730.
37. Id. at 543, 193 S.E.2d at 731.
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fered the following explanation: "[T]he insertion into the Asheville health community of a new, 200-bed general hospital would be an unnecessary and
weakening duplication of services and undesirable dilution of physicians' time in
treating patients at widely separated hospitals. '3 8 In making its decision the
Commission acted pursuant to a state statute 39 typical of those enacted during
this period. 4° The statute mandated in relevant part:
No certificate of need shall be issued unless the action proposed in the
application . . . is necessary to provide new or additional inpatient
facilities in the area to be served, can be economically accomplished
and maintained, and will contribute4to
the orderly development of ade1
quate and effective health services.
Having determined earlier that between 1971 and 1977 the area served by Aston
Park Hospital needed to add only 94 beds, the Commission would not permit
the construction of a new 200-bed facility. 42
In reversing the Commission and striking the certificate of need statute, the
North Carolina Supreme Court clearly indicated that the state legislature has
the authority to subject hospital construction to reasonable regulation. 43 Nevertheless, Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution constrains this
legislative authority. The state constitution provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges
...or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of
the land." 44 According to the court,
Article I, Sec. 19 ... does not permit the Legislature to authorize a
State board or commission to forbid persons, with the use of their own
property and funds, to construct adequate facilities and to employ
therein a licensed professional and quasi-professional staff for the treatment of sick people, who desire the service, merely because to do so
endangers the ability of other, established hospitals to keep all their
45
beds occupied.
The court cited pre-1937 United States Supreme Court authority for the proposition that the police power over public health is not limitless. 46 It also cited
slightly more recent North Carolina cases 47 for the proposition that the exercise
of the state's police power "must have a rational, real, or substantial relation to
the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare." '4 8 Applying
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 543, 193 S.E.2d at 730.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-291 (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1973).
See Curran, supra note 22, at 94-95.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-29(c) (Supp. 1971) (repealed 1973).
Aston Park, 282 N.C. at 543, 193 S.E.2d at 730.
Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735.
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.

45. Aston Park, 282 N.C. at 549, 193 S.E.2d at 734.
46. Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 273
(1932)). 1937 marked the end of the Lochner era, during which the Supreme Court engaged repeatedly in the economic substantive due process analysis. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.

47. Aston Park, 282 N.C. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735 (quoting State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764,
769, 51 S.E.2d. 731, 735 (1949)).

48. Id.
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that test, the court reached a conclusion clearly within the doctrinal tradition of
substantive due process:
We find no such reasonable relation between the denial of the right of a
person, association or corporation to construct and operate upon his or
its own property, with his or its own funds, an adequately staffed and
equipped hospital.... Consequently, we hold that the [CON statute]
...is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law in violation of
...the Constitution of North Carolina insofar as it denies Aston Park
the right to construct and operate its proposed
hospital except upon
49
the issuance to it of a certificate of need.
In support of the holding, Justice Lake made two closely related points that
highlight both the court's economic assumptions and the divergence of those
assumptions from those prevailing in the health care community at the time.
"In the ordinary businesses," the court explained, "it has been the common experience in America that competition is an incentive to lower prices, better service and more efficient management." '50 Hospital construction, according to the
court, was no less amenable to competition than any other industry.5 1 In anticipation of the counterargument that the statute under review might be justified as
public utility regulation, the court stated that public utility regulation is distinguished first by its undertaking to control the potential abuses of a monopoly
and second by public determination of the utility's rates.5 2 Because hospital

construction in Asheville was not, in the judgment of the court, a monopoly, and
because the CON statute did not entail
public rate-making, the analogy to public
53
utility regulation did not pertain.
C. The Law After Aston Park
In the year after the Aston Park decision, Congress passed the National
Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.54 Although the 1974
Health Planning Act did not mandate state passage of CON statutes, it conditioned the receipt of federal funding for numerous health programs on state
adoption of a comprehensive CON regime.5 5 Thus, the federal legislation effectively forced states either to pass such statutes or to bring existing CON statutes
into compliance with the 1974 Health Planning Act. 56 North Carolina chal57
lenged this effective requirement in North Carolinaex rel. Morrow v. Califano,
wherein the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Caro49. Id.
50. Id. at 549, 193 S.E.2d at 734.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 550, 193 S.E.2d at 734.
53. Id. at 550, 193 S.E.2d at 734-35. It is interesting to note that the author of the only contemporary, article-length critique of Aston Parkimplies that he does find the analogy between hospital construction and utility regulation persuasive. See Comment, supra note 2, at 799-802.
54. Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1974) repealed by Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99660, § 701(a), 100 Stat. 3799.
55. Id.
56. Simpson, supra note 12, at 1042.
57. 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem, 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
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lina upheld the CON provisions of the Health Planning Act in a decision affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.5 8 Although the North Carolina
Supreme Court never expressly overruled Aston Park, in 1977, shortly before the

Morrow decision, the North Carolina legislature enacted a new certificate of
need statute that brought the state into compliance with the 1974 Health Planning Act. 59 The Morrow decision, thus, merely confirmed the legislature's federally endorsed circumvention of Aston Park.
In effect, Aston Parkhas been a legal dead letter since 1978.60 Nevertheless,

it may be that its time has come, gone, and come again. In the post-1974 Health
Planning Act world, the potential for substantive due process review 61 of state

CON regulation of hospital construction takes on a new relevance.
III. THE MERITS OF ECONOMIC DUE PROCESS REVIEW
A.

FederalSubstantive Due Process

Although the search for a precise and generally acceptable definition of substantive due process may be a quixotic endeavor, Professor Perry's terse formula
will serve for purposes of this Article. According to Professor Perry, substantive
due process is "the judicial practice of constitutionalizing values that cannot
fairly be inferred from the constitutional text, the structure of the government
ordained by the Constitution, or historical materials clarifying otherwise vague
constitutional provisions."'62 The doctrine is highly controversial, frequently
maligned, and closely associated with United States Supreme Court decisions
invalidating numerous pieces of social and economic legislation in the first third
of the twentieth century. 63 The paradigmatic economic due process case of this
era is of course Lochner v. New York.64
58. North Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978) (mem.).
59. North Carolina Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1978, ch. 1182, 1977
N.C. Sess. Laws 71 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § IE-175 to -191 (1988)).
60. Given the substantial level of academic interest in the case, it is remarkable how rarely it is
cited in later decisions. Searches of Shepard's Citationsand several computer databases revealed no
more than a handful of subsequent citations. See Wall & Ochs, Inc. v. Hicks, 469 F. Supp. 873, 882
(E.D.N.C. 1979) (mentioning Aston Park in passing as a potential alternative basis for plaintiff's
constitutional claim); Mount Royal Towers, Inc. v. Alabama Bd.of Health, 388 So. 2d 1209, 1211,
1214-15 (Ala. 1980) (reaffirming legitimacy of substantive due process review, but declining to apply
Aston Park reasoning to reverse a denial of a certificate of need to a nursing home); Hospital Group
of Western North Carolina, Inc. v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, 76 N.C. App, 265,
267, 332 S.E.2d 748, 750 (1985) (referring toAston Parkonly to explain that plaintiff's constitutional
question was not properly before the court). No court outside of North Carolina has unambiguously
adopted the Aston Park holding. See, ag., Goodin v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Welfare Comm'n, 436
F. Supp. 583, 585 n.2 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (declining to follow Aston Park); Merry Heart Nursing and
Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Dougherty, 131 N.J. Super. 412, 420, 330 A.2d 370, 374 (1974) (expressly rejecting Aston Park).
61. In the interests of brevity, this Article will borrow from Professor Wonnell the shorthand
"economic due process" in place of "substantive due process review of economic regulation." See
Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservationof Competition, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91,
92 (1983).
62. Perry, SubstantiveDue ProcessRevisited:Reflections on (andBeyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw.
U.L. REv. 417, 419 (1976) (footnote omitted).
63. For an excellent review of the Court's Lochner era economic due process decisions, see
Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 265, 269-80.
64. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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In Lochner and other substantive due process cases decided between 1897

and 1937,65 the Supreme Court relied upon the due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments 66 to strike statutes such as the famous New York

law limiting bakers to sixty hours of work per week. The Court struck these
measures after finding them inconsistent with the Court's understanding of the

economic liberties of American citizens. 67 These Supreme Court decisions interfered with early state efforts to enact economic and social regulation and ob-

structed President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal legislative program. 68 In

short, the Lochner approach gave the application of substantive due process
analysis to social and economic legislation a bad name. Critics have charged
that economic substantive due process constitutes an antidemocratic exercise of

authority by unelected federal judges in contravention of the popular will embodied in legislation. 69 As Justice Holmes wrote in his frequently quoted Lochner dissent: "This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part

of the country does not entertain."'70 Another more recently articulated argument against economic substantive due process, focusing on the relative institutional competence of the judicial and legislative branches of government,
contends that legislatures are better able to investigate and evaluate complex
economic and social policy questions than are the courts.7 1 As a matter of institutional competence, then, courts have been urged to treat economic legislation
with the greatest possible deference.
Although the United States Supreme Court has continued to generate sub-

stantive due process decisions concerning noneconomic issues involving rights of
a personal nature, 72 since 1937 the Court has abandoned economic substantive
due process entirely. 73 Given life tenure among the appointed federal judiciary
65. The Lochner era began in earnest with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and
ended with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Phillips, supra note 63, at 270-81.
66. U.S. CONsT. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 391
(relying on fourteenth amendment).
67. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61; Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 597; see also Phillips, supra note 63, at
270-71 (an "important aspect of economic substantive due process is its inclusion of economic rights,
especially freedom of contract, within the 'liberty' protected by the fifth and fourteenth amendments"). For a critique of the Lochner approach, see Strong, The Economic Philosophy ofLochner
Emergence, Embrasure, and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 419 (1973).
68. See, eg., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) (striking provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act).
69. Phillips, supra note 63, at 290-91; see also Strong, supra note 67, at 449-55 (describing the
United States Supreme Court's relatively rapid abandonment of Lochner in the mid-1930s, emphasizing in part the Court's rediscovery of the policy-making prerogatives of legislatures).
70. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
71. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 62, at 423; see also Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 60 (1984) ("[J]udges have not been charged with imposing
their substantive views on the economic system. Judges' claim to authority rests on a plausible
demonstration that they are faithfully executing decisions made by others.").
72. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); see Phillips, supra note 63, at 282.
73. The Court subjects economic regulation to a "rational basis" scrutiny: if the regulation
could have a rational basis, it is upheld. See, eg., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-32 (1963);
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc. 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246
(1941); see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-7 (1988); see also Phillips, supra note
63, at 282 (noting increased judicial reliance on substantive due process after a 50-year line of decisions nullifying economic substantive due process).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

and the exceeding difficulty and infrequency with which the United States Con-

stitution is amended, 74 the standard political critique of the Lochner approachthat it is antidemocratic-has understandably carried substantial weight. It is
.worth noting, nonetheless, that although our political culture has reached a
rough consensus that federal substantive due process will be restricted to certain
issues of public morality, 75 there is no iron logic dictating the point at which this
line should be drawn.
Indeed the criticism that substantive due process is antidemocratic, while
appealing in its evocation of grade school civics and class values, rings rather

hollow when placed in the context of everyday political practice. As a preliminary matter, few students of politics would argue that all legislation reflects the

democratic will, in that the electorate would approve each measure if presented
as a referendum. 76 Moreover, ours is a constitutional system riddled with filters,

limitations, and occasional outright denials of democratic will. 77 If unelected
judges may declare that the Constitution constrains state legislatures from enacting certain restrictions on the availability of abortions, it is not at all theoretically clear why the same judges may not declare that the same Constitution
prohibits state legislatures from limiting the number of hours a baker may work
in one week to sixty.
The institutional competence argument is also rather facile. Even conceding that legislatures are better able to collect data and produce reports on ques-

tions of economic policy, it does not follow that legislators are necessarily more
74. The United States Constitution has been amended only 26 times since the documeht went
into effect, and only 16 times in the 198 years between 1791 and 1989. See U.S. CONST. amends. IXXVI; J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1113 app. B at 1121-31
(1986) (presenting each amendment with the date of ratification and historical notes).
75. See Perry, supra note 62, at 424.
76. See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59-60 (1951) (postulating that, to encompass a wide range of individual preferences excluding interpersonal utility comparisons, social welfare judgments must be either "imposed or dictorial"); 3 F. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 1-8 (1979) (defending the democratic form of government despite the
majority's tendency to support legislation that favors special groups at the expense of the common
will); Wonnell, supra note 61, at 100 ("The developing theory of public choice... postulates certain
conditions under which a properly functioning democratic political process consistently may thwart
majority values." (footnote omitted)).
77. Representative government (as opposed to direct voting on all measures as referenda) for
fixed terms, bureaucratic discretion, gerrymandering (effectively diluting the votes of some citizens),
and judicial elaboration of the Bill of Rights provide four prominent examples. See generally Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985) (arguing that the
American constitutional structure reflects the Madisonian ideal of deliberative democracy in which
elected officials may pursue their understanding of the "public interest," distinguished from the aggregation of private interests). According to one student commentator,
Since most of the framers of state and federal constitutions were steeped in the Lockeian tradition they probably did believe that all government is established to accomplish
certain limited objects of mutual concern to members of the political community. If they
had been asked to define those objects, it seems likely that they would have defined them in
terms of traditional ends of government which were familiar to them ....Therefore, the
originators of substantive due process may have been carrying out the spirit of these constitutions when they decreed that legislators could not act beyond the scope of the police
powers, even if their position did depart from the historic meaning of the phrase "due
process of law."
Note, Counterrevolution in State ConstitutionalLaw, 15 STAN. L. REV. 309, 329-30 (1963).
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competent than judges in evaluating the data, once it has been collected, and in
making policy decisions.
B.

Economic Due Process and the State Courts

Although most states have adopted the United States Supreme Court's
highly deferential approach to economic legislation, a number of states, including North Carolina, have continued to subject such legislation to economic due
process review. 78 This is not to suggest that there is a logically consistent body
of state economic due process doctrine that is applied predictably and systematically. On the contrary, inconsistent results and conclusory reasoning are not
79
uncommon in such cases.

State courts vary as to which types of economic regulation are subjected to
substantive due process review, but one of the most prominent themes in state
economic due process decisions is hostility toward statutes creating monopolies,

restrictive licensing requirements, and other barriers to economic competition.8 0
Anticompetitive regulations are particularly likely to be invalidated as exceeding
the police power of state legislatures or as failing to bear a substantial relation to

a legitimate legislative purpose.8 1 The theoretical basis for hostility to anticompetitive regulation is, perhaps not surprisingly, quite reminiscent of the Lochner
Court: State economic due process cases frequently presume a right to engage

freely in any lawful calling. 8 2 There is, moreover, a strong presumption in favor
83

of competitive markets.
Although the case for federal economic due process review is politically
problematic, the case for state economic due process is, under appropriate circumstances, quite compelling. When conducted properly, state economic due

process review serves a number of salutary public purposes. First, economic due
78. See generally Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of
Law, 53 Nw. L. REv. 227, 229-34, 239 (1958) (reviewing numerous post-1937 state economic due
process decisions particularly in the areas of professional licensing and legislative price-fixing). According to Professor Kirby, the substantive due process doctrine has been used by the state courts to
strike down a variety of anticompetitive measures by way of "judicial determinations that serve no
legitimate public purpose. These measures have included legislative regulation of prices charged for
haircuts, dry cleaning, cigarettes, business franchises, and milk." Kirby, supra note 2, at 253-54; see
also Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REv. 91, 92
(1950) ("Since 1937 some state supreme courts when interpreting the due process clause or its
equivalent in their state constitutions have continued to interfere freely with legislative policies.");
Developments in the Law-The InterpretationofState ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324,
1479 (1982) [hereinafter Developments] (judicial review "of the substantive content of economic regulations takes place at the state level under both due process and equal protection" clauses).
79. See Hetherington, supra note 78, at 241 (state substantive due process review "has produced a large body of decisions which cannot be harmonized"); Howard, supra note 2, at 886-887
(often, grounds of state substantive due process decisions are unclear or "state courts do not explore
the justifications for their creation of a body of substantive due process law independent of federal
constitutional law").
80. See Howard, supra note 2, at 885, 890 (citing Aston Park); Paulsen, supra note 78, at 105;
Developments, supra note 78, at 1469-71.
81. See Developments, supra note 78, at 1467-70.
82. Hetherington, supra note 78, at 241; Paulsen, supra note 78, at 104; Developments, supra
note 78, at 1471.
83. See Howard, supra note 2, at 890; Developments, supra note 78, at 1469.
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process imposes the procedural requirement that the legislature bear the burden
of articulating a "public value"8 4 as a justification for an act of economic regulation. 85 While mere rationality review requires only that a court might be able to
conceive of a public purpose for a given statute, substantive due process requires
both the articulation of a public value and a demonstration of the connection
between that public value and the legislative measure. 86 As a procedural matter,
this hardly seems burdensome. It is, moreover, consistent with other types of
87
constitutional analysis, such as equal protection review of racial classifications,
that require the government to have an articulable public purpose (other than

prejudice or the raw political power of one group in relation to another) for

88
giving an advantage to Group A at the expense of Group B.
A second, related benefit of economic due process is that it provides a substantive check on the power of legislatures to regulate economic affairs. 89
Although it is commonly argued that popular voting provides such a check, 90
the general election is a very crude and cumbersome political tool for dealing
with specific and often unnoticed examples of legislative overreaching in the
realm of economic regulation. 9 ' Unless one is prepared to argue that such legis-

84. The phrase is borrowed from Sunstein, Naked Preferencesand the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689, 1692 (1984).
85. Comment, State Economic Substantive Due Process:A ProposedApproach, 88 YALE L.J,
1487, 1505 (1979) ("Courts should require the state to articulate the ends that justify economic
legislation."). For the argument that federal legislation should be subject to federal judicial review to
enforce a constitutional requirement that congressional statutes serve public-regarding purposes, see
Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421 (1987); Mashaw, Constitutional Deregulation: Notes Toward a Public, PublicLaw, 54 TUL. L. REV. 849 (1980).
86. See Developments, supra note 78, at 1467-69; Note, supra note 77, at 327-28.
87. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 532, 548-54 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103, 114-16 (1976).
88. One commentator argues that federal constitutional review under the dormant commerce,
privileges and immunities, equal protection, due process, contract, and eminent domain clauses is
"united by a common theme and focused on a single underlying evil: the distribution of resources or
opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they want." Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1689; see also
Rose-Ackerman, ProgressiveLaw and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J.
341, 351-54 (1988) (arguing that courts should require federal legislation to articulate both a public
purpose and a plausible relation between the articulated public purpose and the means adopted in
the legislation).
89. Epstein, The Active Virtues, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 16; Comment, supra note 85,
at 1489-90.
90. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726,
730-31 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955); see also A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1962) ("[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that
is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the
policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing
characteristic of the system."); P. BonnITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 59-73 (1982) (describing a
school of "prudential" constitutional jurisprudence that finds virtue in the Court's passive accommodation of the policy determinations of the elected branches of government); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 4, 68, 131-34 (1980) (echoing Bickel and arguing further that it is the role of courts
to make sure that it is the democratic political process that actually makes public policy decisions).
91. See Fitts, The Vices of Virtue: A PoliticalParty Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the
LegislativeProcess, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1583-84 (1988) ("While legal scholarship once focused
on the bias of the majority as perhaps the central dilemma of constitutional law, now the bias and
power of narrow special interest groups may have become a greater constitutional worry."); RoseAckerman, supra note 88, at 350 ("In a legislative deal, a high proportion of affected parties need not
agree to the terms. Only majority support in the legislature is needed, and even supporters may
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lative abuses never occur, that only those abuses for which popular voting im-

poses political accountability require a remedy, and that the legislature should
be the sole judge of the limits of its own economic power in every case not

raising'an election issue, the argument for economic due process as a political

check cannot be dismissed out of hand. It should be noted, moreover, that the
concept of political checks on legislative authority is consistent with the tradi-

tion of separation of powers 92 -as opposed to the limitless parliamentary sovereignty found in the British political system-that runs through two centuries of

93
American state and federal constitutional history.
A third potential benefit of economic due process is that it may provide for
the vindication of the public interest in those frequent cases of legislative failure
in which the legislative process has been captured by minority or special interest. 94 Paradoxically, then, economic due process may serve a distinctly democratic or majoritarian function. Even when the legislature provides a forum for
a broad range of well-represented interests, the result reached as the product of
pluralist struggle and compromise may be antithetical to the majority interest.9"
It is a debatable proposition of pluralist ideology, not a self-evident truth, that
the general public interest necessarily coincides with the aggregation of represented private and public interests in the legislative process of a democratically
elected legislature. 96 Experience and the illuminative perspectives of public
choice theory 97 suggest, moreover, that in practice there are gross inequalities in

represent many people who are opposed to the new law."); Wonnell, supranote 61, at 100-11 ("even
an 'ideal' democratic political process may be inherently unable to weigh the competing values embodied in [such economic measures as] monopoly legislation.").
92. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952) ("Steel seizure case"
turning on distinctions between executive and legislative authority); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18
(1958) (citing Marbury v. Madison for the proposition that "it is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is"); Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176
(1803) (positing that the United States constitutional system is characterized by three separate "departments," each with a defined and limited role); see also Cutler, Party Government underthe American Constitution, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 25, 26-27 (1985). See generally A. BICKEL, supra note 90
(reviewing authority and propriety ofjudicial review); L. TRIE, supranote 73, at 18-400 (presenting
a unified analysis of constitutional law).
93. See Epstein, supra note 89, at 16. The appealing myth of boundless legislative supremacy is
consistent with democratic majoritarian political ideology, but it does not describe the American
political system. In practice, there are numerous checks on the authority of Congress and the state
legislatures inour written and unwritten constitutions. See generallyH. LINDE, G. BUNN, F. PAFF
& W. CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 4-455 (1981) (discussing substantive and procedural limitations on the legislative authority of state legislatures and the Congress of

the United States).
94. Hetherington, supra note 78, at 249; Developments, supra note 78, at 1488-89; Comment,
supra note 85, at 1489-90.
95. Professor Sunstein, addressing the interest group problem, is one prominent contemporary
legal scholar who rejects the notion that the public good emerges from the pluralist competition of
political factions. He favors instead a Madisonian conception of a deliberative legislative process in
which legislators all pursue the public interest, rather than pursuing myriad special interests. Professor Sunstein suggests, moreover, that this deliberative ideal would be facilitated by the judicial application of a heightened rationality standard in constitutional review of legislation. Sunstein, supra
note 77, at 31-33, 69.
96. Id. at 31-49.
97. See R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (collective action analyzed as an economic
theory of individual contribution to group action); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965) (examining group dynamics and presenting a new theory of pressure groups); Wonnell, supra
note 61, at 100-11. Professor Michael Fitts defines public choice theory as "the application of eco-
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the representation of public and private interests in the legislative process. Legislative results frequently reflect not the open competition of all segments of
society potentially affected by legislation under consideration, but rather the disproportionate influence of highly organized and politically sophisticated special
98
interests.
As a general matter, the dynamics of collective action are such that the
interests of the average voter or consumer in economic regulation are likely to be
consistently underrepresented in the legislative process, while the interests of the
relatively small pressure group are likely to be overrepresented. 99 In the case of
economic regulation, the industry groups for whom the regulation has a large
potential cost or benefit will have a disproportionately large incentive to organize, to obtain relevant information, and to bring political pressure to bear on
legislators. 100 Given the large individual benefit or cost and the relatively small
size of the industry group, the smaller group is better able to enforce organizational unity and to dissuade free riders.10 1 A large and diffuse group, such as
consumers potentially affected by anticompetitive legislation, will have a very
difficult time organizing to exert political pressure. Because the average detriment of a higher price is likely to be relatively modest, especially when compared to the average potential benefit for members of the industry group, the
individual consumer has little incentive to incur the costs of organizing, obtaining information, and exerting political pressure. Moreover, since the consumer goal (the lower price) is a public good, no consumer can be excluded from
the benefit, even if free-rider consumers fail to contribute to the costs of political
action.10 2 It is, therefore, in the interest of the individual consumer to be a free
rider and to eschew contributing to the costs of political action.10 3 Thus, "even
an 'ideal' democratic political process may be inherently unable to weigh the
14
competing values embodied in monopoly legislation." 0
In combination, the advantages of the procedural requirement that a legislature articulate a public value, the concern that the legislature not be the sole
judge of the extent of its own regulatory power, and the value of allowing the
vindication of a general public interest in cases in which the legislative process
has produced a result antithetical to the interests of most citizens constitute a
nomic models and principles to the study of political behavior." Interview with Professor Michael

Fitts (Sept. 13, 1989); see also Rose-Ackerman, supra note 88, at 344 (1988) ("Public choice theory
attempts to provide realistic positive models of politics and to find methods of making collective

choices that have desirable normative characteristics."); Symposium on the Theory ofPublic Choice,
74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988) (presenting various commentators' analyses and applications of public
choice theory).
98. For a concise summary of the problem and references to the literature on special interests in
the legislative process, see Fitts, supra note 91, at 1572; supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
99. See M. OLSON, supra note 97, at 36; Wonnell, supra note 61, at 100-11.
100. See M. OLSON, supra note 97, at 2; Wonnell, supra note 61, at 100-11.

101. See M. OLSON, supra note 97, at 9-16; Wonnell, supra note 61, at 100-11. A "free ride" is
defined as "a benefit ... gained or accepted at another's expense or without cost to or effort by the
one benefitting." WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 907 (1976).
102. Wonnell, supra note 61, at 107.
103. M. OLSON, supra note 97, at 5-52; Goldin, Price ExternalitiesInfluence Public Policy, 23
PUB. CHOICE 1, 3 (1975); Wonnell, supra note 61, at 100-11.

104. Wonnell, supra note 61, at 100.
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powerful set of arguments that support substantive due process review of state
economic regulation.10 5 The most troublesome counterargument, as in the case
of federal substantive due process review, is that even when it may be rational,

substantive due process review is antidemocratic.10 6 Although this point may
fundamentally undermine the legitimacy of federal substantive due process re-

view, several factors make it difficult to accept the majoritarian argument
against state substantive due process review. First, in all but three states10 7 the
judges of the highest state courts are subject to various forms of majoritarian

review, either through competitive elections, noncompetitive approval elections

10 8
upon the expiration of fixed terms, or through popular recall of sitting judges.
Thus, to the extent that voting checks the authoritarian imposition of values and
lends legitimacy to the exercise of political authority, state judges act with con-

siderably more democratic legitimacy than do federal judges and with not much
less legitimacy than state legislators.10 9 Second, although amendment of the

United States Constitution is difficult and infrequent, amendment of state constitutions is neither: "Between 1970 and 1979, the states adopted a total of 946
amendments to their state constitutions." 110 For voters in many states, the process of amending the state constitution is no more cumbersome than that of
voting on a referendum or an initiative.11 1 Given the nature of state constitu-

tional systems, then, the majoritarian argument against substantive due process
review is severely weakened. As one commentary notes:

The availability of such channels for popular revision of state constitutions has clear implications for the legitimacy of judicial review. The
document that judges enforce is likely to reflect recent popular atti-

tudes and goals and if a court's interpretation of the constitution devi105. For two general judicial endorsements of state supreme court "activism" in the interpretation of state constitutional provisions, see Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1081 (1985) and Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of
FundamentalRights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983). For two critiques of state supreme court
"activism," see Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEx. L. REV. 995 (1985), and
Cameron, The Placefor JudicialActivism on the Partof a State'sHighest Court, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 279 (1977).
106. Seeeg., Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview Under the
CaliforniaConstitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 986, 994, 1009-10 (1979); McKnight, Minnesota RationalRelation Test: The Lochner Monster in the 10,000 Lakes, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
709, 736-38 (1984).
107. 26 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATES 161-63 (1986). Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island have no majoritarian review of judges. Id.
108. See Developments, supra note 78, at 1351.
109. It may be argued that because state legislators must seek reelection every few years, they are
more democratically accountable than state judges. Perhaps, but the actual differences between state
legislators' and state judges' electoral accountability varies enormously from state to state. See supra
notes 107-08 and accompanying text. Moreover, the point concerning frequent elections cuts both
ways. Constantly seeking reelection can make it difficult for legislators to take the long view. Frequent campaigns also leave many state legislators especially vulnerable to special interest groups that
provide much of the financing needed to run frequent popular elections. State judges are insulated
from many of the corrupting pressures of frequent campaigns so that they may be better able to
consider the long-term, overall public interest than their counterparts in the legislatures. In this
sense, state courts may approximate the Madisonian ideal of "deliberative democracy" more closely
than state legislatures. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 31.
110. Developments, supra note 78, at 1354 n.108.
111. Id. at 1354.
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public sentiment, a majority vote can overrule the
* ates sufficiently 1from
12
court's reading.
C. A Theory of Legislative Failure
The foregoing discussion suggests that state economic due process review

can protect the public interest and that such state court review does not necessarily conflict with democratic values. Indeed, on some occasions such review
may be indispensable to the vindication of democratic values.1 13 A question
naturally arises as to when a state court should engage in substantive due process

review of economic regulation and when it should defer to legislative judgment.1 14 While a general theory of substantive due process is beyond the scope
of this Article, it is necessary to develop some guidelines for deciding when it is
appropriate for a state court to subject state economic regulation to substantive
due process review1 Is-that is to formulate a theory of "legislative failure."116
Because the legislation reviewed in Aston Park is fairly categorized as anticompetitive, and because there is a long tradition of state court review of such stat11 7
utes, the theory developed here will be confined to anticompetitive legislation.
The theory is as follows: A state court is justified in subjecting anticompetitive
legislation to economic substantive due process review when the statute before
the court suggests 1) that the political process which led to the passage of the
regulatory legislation reflects the triumph of organized special interests over the
interests of the relatively unorganized majority; and 2) the content of the regulatory regime suggests the phenomenon of industry capture of the political machinery of the state."18 Of necessity, this requires an impressionistic judgment
for which the factual basis rarely will be unequivocal. Nevertheless, if the Aston
112. Id.
113. See id. at 498 (suggesting that state supreme courts engage in a kind of "majoritarian review" of special interest legislation).
114. See generally Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 106, at 981-86 (discussing "the need for
[state] courts to exercise self-restraint in expanding state constitutional interpretation and to develop
principled neutral bases for invoking the state, rather than the federal, constitution"); Note, The New
Federalism: Toward a PrincipledInterpretationofthe State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 321
(1977) (arguing that "independent [state supreme court] interpretation should be applauded as a
useful source of constitutional interpretation ... provided that it is done in a careful and principled
way").
115. The author is indebted in this endeavor to ideas presented in Wonnell, supra note 61, and
Comment, supra note 85, both of which suggest guidelines for economic due process review. This
Article's approach, though in some respects conceptually similar to Professor Wonnell's, addresses
the state courts, while Professor Wonnell's is directed toward the federal judiciary. Although this
Article borrows the suggestion that state courts require legislatures to articulate a public value for
any state economic regulation, see Comment, supra note 85, at 1505, it does not attempt to construct
a general approach to all state economic legislation, but rather has restricted itself to a detailed
discussion of the merits of state court review of a specific type of legislation-anticompetitive state
statutes.
116. The term appears in Epstein, supra note 89, at 15.
117. Professor Wonnell's discussion also focuses on judicial review of anticompetitive legislation
but in the context of federal law. See Wonnell, supra note 61, at 92.
118. The concept of industry capture is derived from Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3, 3 (1971) ("as a rule, regulation is acquired by [an] industry
and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit") and Posner, Theories ofRegulation, 5 BELL J.
ECON & MGMT Sci. 335, 335-36 (1974) (rejecting a public interest theory of legislation in favor of an
interest group model favored by economists). See also Wonnell, supra note 61, at 105 n.58 (acknowl-
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Park court is at all representative, state courts generally should be able to recog-

nize this type of legislative failure.
IV.

A.

STATE CON REGULATION:

A

CASE OF LEGISLATIVE FAILURE?

Collective Action Problems and Interest Group Influence

Faced with the type of CON statute that the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed in Aston Park, would a court suspect that the statute reflects the

relative strength of organized special interests in the legislative process? In some
respects, the arcane issue of hospital construction presents an exceptionally
strong case for suspecting a disproportionate influence of organized special interests. The subject is complex, and the costs of obtaining information are correspondingly high. Interest groups that stand to gain or lose substantially
depending on the details of such legislation include hospital administrators,
health insurance providers, physicians, and public health officials. At stake for

members of these groups may be employment, status, professional autonomy,
and the opportunity to shape the nature of the institutions that deliver health

care.1 19 The members of these groups are exceptionally well informed and are
well organized to influence the legislative process. 120 By contrast, the average

consumer gives little thought to the issue of hospital construction. 12 1 The stakes
for the consumer in the struggle over state CON regulation are generally unnoticed unless the consumer requires extensive hospital care. Although the consumer has a financial stake in the legislation (even if only in potentially higher or
lower health insurance premiums), he must incur information costs to obtain
information and form his opinion. If he wants to influence the political process,
he must be prepared to contribute resources to defray the costs of political action.122 Although many factors influence the legislative process, health care industry grohps can be expected to manifest an interest in hospital construction
edging that the author's analysis of political process is based in part on Professor Stigler's The Theory ofEconomic Regulation).
119. Payton and Powsner explain at length the extent to which the legislative battles over state
CON regulation were struggles over the institutional future of health care and who would control it.
See Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 203-14. In their assessment, the battle was won-at least, as
of the 1960s and early 1970s-by the Blue Cross health insurance organizations and the partisans of
the large, voluntary, teaching hospital. Id. Professor Stevens documents the development from the
1930s of the voluntary teaching hospital as the dominant medical institution in the American health
care system. R. STEVENS, supra note 15, at 140-70. Her research is consistent with the Payton and
Powsner view that the large voluntary hospitals supported CON regimes to gain public subsidies
while retaining professional dominance of the provision of health care. Id. at 305-09.
120. See generally Curran, supra note 22, at 86-90 (discussing the health care interest groups
supporting state CON legislation in the late 1960s and early 1970s); Schramm, State Hospital Cost
Containment: An Analysis ofLegislative Initiatives, 19 IND. L. REV. 919, 926-36 (1986) (discussing
the current legislative initiatives of various health care interest groups).
121. See Schramm, supra note 120, at 932 (noting consumer apathy on hospital cost-containment issues); see also Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the HospitalIndustry?, 93 HARV. L. REV.
1416, 1419-21 (1980) (referring to consumer ignorance regarding important but complex information on health care as one of the "endemic problems of the health care industry").
122. Economists such as Professor Stigler, supra note 118, at 10-13, and Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 212-13 (1976), usefully conceptualize the
legislator as the "seller" of the resources of government. The consumer, then, is in a bidding war
with producers who also bid for the services of politicians to harness the resources of the state.
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decisions and to engage in political action to shape the applicable legislation.
Most health care consumers, by contrast, can be expected to adopt the posture
of free riders,123 perhaps hoping to benefit from the political action of others on
behalf of consumer interests. The rational health care consumer is likely to calculate, to the extent that any conscious choice is made, that the potential marginal benefit to each individual discounted by the possibility that he will not
receive any benefit at all, does not exceed the individual cost of political action.
While the purpose of this Article is not to develop a legislative history of
the passage of state CON statutes in North Carolina and elsewhere, the historical sources tend to bear out the expectation suggested by the theory, namely that
special interests typically prevail over the general public interest in commanding
legislative attention.1 24 Thus, under the first prong of the theory of legislative
failure articulated in this article, state CON regulation of the type at issue in
Aston Park presents a strong circumstantial case for substantive due process review by state judges.
B. Cartelization By Any Other Name
The second element of the theory of legislative failure, evidence of industry
capture, is derived from Professor George Stigler's article, The Theory of Eco126
nomic Regulation125 and from subsequent elaborations of Stigler's work.
Professor Stigler's theory builds, in part, on the public choice understanding of
collective action 1 27 and develops the implications of industry political power as
that power relates to the interaction between politically powerful industry interest groups and the machinery of the state.128 Challenging an earlier view that
economic regulation may be understood primarily as a public-interest response
to instances of market failure, Stigler argues that "as a rule, regulation is ac1 29
quired by... industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.'
Although there are several forms of regulatory aid that industry may seek to
acquire from government, the theory holds that every industry or occupation that
has enough politicalpower to utilize the state will seek to control entry.130 In
addition, the regulatory policy often will be fashioned so as to retard the growth
rate of new firms.' 3 I If an industry successfully obtains regulation controlling
entry, the legal authority of the state is employed to enforce a cartel of industry
123. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
124. See Payton & Powsner, supra note 5, at 206-14; Posner, supra note 28, at 116.
125. Stigler, supra note 118.
126. See, eg., Peltzman, supra note 122, at 211 (analysis of The Theory of Economic Regulation
and Stigler's subsequent influence in the field); Posner, supra note 118, at 343 (Stigler's theory "insists with the political scientists that economic regulation serves the private interests of politically

effective groups.").
127. Discussed supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
128. Stigler, supranote 118, at 10-13. Posner contrasts the "public interest" and "capture" theories in his Theories of Economic Regulation. Posner, supra note 118, at 335-50.
129. Stigler, supra note 118, at 3.
130. Id. at 5.
131. Id.
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incumbents. 132 Potentially more efficient producers are barred in whole or in

part from entering the cartelized market. Industry incumbents, thus insulated
from competition, can restrict supply or extract higher prices than would be the
133
case in a competitive market.
Although Stigler's analysis has been corroborated by a number of empirical
studies of regulated industries, 134 it is not argued here that the theory accurately
describes the relation between anticompetitive legislation and the affected industries in all cases. Rather, the argument is that when a legislative regime appears
to reflect industry capture, that regime is ripe for substantive due process review
by state courts.
Circumstantial evidence regarding the type of state CON regulation reviewed by the Aston Park court suggests that such legislation is likely to fit the
model of industry capture. 135 State CON statutes do indeed create state-enforced cartels of industry incumbents. 136 Certificate of need statutes establish
administrative mechanisms for restricting market entry and limiting the expansion of capacity. It is also worth recalling as a historical point that the wave of
state CON statutes enacted in the late 1960s and early 1970s had the enthusias137
tic support of the American Hospital Association and the Blue Cross.
Whether state CON regulation allows industry incumbents to extract monopoly
or oligopoly rents is a more complicated empirical question, given the myriad
factors that contribute to inflation in hospital costs. It has not been established
138
anywhere, however, that these regimes did anything to control hospital costs.
A state judge, therefore, would have substantial justification for viewing state
CON statutes of the type at issue in Aston Park as suspiciously indicative of
139
industry capture.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT POLICY

With the repeal of the 1974 Health Planning Act 14 and the emergence of a
trend toward deregulation of the health care industry, state officials once again
face fundamental questions concerning the appropriate role of market forces in
132. See Posner, supra note 118, at 344-47; Wonnell, supra note 61, at 97; see also Emshwiller,
Agencies Block CompetitionBy Small Firms, Wall St. J., Jul. 26, 1989, at Bi, col. 6 (documenting the

continuing vitality of cartel legislation at the state level).
133. Wonnell, supra note 61, at 97.
134. See Posner, supra note 118, at 337 n.3 (collecting empirical studies).
135. In 1972, then-Professor Posner cogently drew the close parallels between CON statutes for
health care facilities construction and state-enforced cartelization regimes in other regulated industries. Posner, supranote 28, at 113-17. Moreover, Payton and Powsner concluded in their historical
study that state CON regimes are textbook examples of industry capture. Payton & Powsner, supra
note 5, at 209, 211; see also Sloan & Steinwald, Effects ofRegulation on HospitalCosts and Input Use,
23 J.L. & ECoN. 81, 105 (1980) ("there is some support in these findings ... for believing that
regulatory agencies are subject to capture").
136. Havighurst, supra note 24, at 1149.
137. See supra notes 17, 22-23 and accompanying texts.
138. See, eg., Sloan & Steinwald, supra note 135, at 105 ("the bulk of this evidence has to be
taken as generally unfavorable to regulatory solutions to hospital cost inflation").
139. But see Havighurst, supra note 24, at 1178-88 (asserting that the capture analysis provides
only a partial explanation of the relation between the hospital industry and state CON regimes).
140. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, P.L. 99-660, § 701 (a), 100 Stat. 3799.
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the provision of health care. 141 Although it is likely that state legislatures will
make most policy choices regarding the future of state CON regulations, the
courts may also have a voice in evaluating the continued validity of government
restriction on investment in hospital capacity. This Article has argued, by
means of an exploration and development of a theoretical rationale for the Aston
Park decision, that under some circumstances state courts are entirely justified
in subjecting state CON regulation to substantive due process review.
If and when state courts engage in substantive due process review of state
legislation restricting competition in the health care industry, the foregoing discussion advocates the application of a legislative failure analysis to determine
whether the legislation is entitled to the judicial deference with which economic
legislation is generally treated. When a state court is presented with evidence
suggesting legislative failure and industry capture, the court should require, at a
minimum, that the state articulate a coherent rationale based both on a public
value and on a demonstrated consideration of the empirical evidence relevant to
the policy choice. If, upon its own evaluation of the relevant legislative facts, the
state court finds that the legislation establishes a cartel at the expense of the
public interest, the court would be justified in striking the statute as violative of
substantive due process.

141. See, eg., Johnson, 3 States Weigh New HospitalPrice.Setting Rules, N.Y. Times, May 24,
1989, at Al, col. 2. (reporting on the debate over revision of hospital regulations in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut).

